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Current theoretical models of the commons assert that common-pool resources can only be managed
sustainably with clearly defined boundaries around both communities and the resources that they use. In
these theoretical models, open access inevitably leads to a tragedy of the commons. However, in many open-
access systems, use of common-pool resources seems to be sustainable over the long term (i.e., current
resource use does not threaten use of common-pool resources for future generations). Here, we outline the
conditions that support sustainable resource use in open property regimes. We use the conceptual
framework of complex adaptive systems to explain how processes within and couplings between human and
natural systems can lead to the emergence of efficient, equitable, and sustainable resource use. We illustrate
these dynamics in eight case studies of different social–ecological systems, including mobile pastoralism,
marine and freshwater fisheries, swidden agriculture, and desert foraging. Our theoretical framework iden-
tifies eight conditions that are critical for the emergence of sustainable use of common-pool resources in
open property regimes. In addition, we explain how changes in boundary conditions may push open prop-
erty regimes to either common property regimes or a tragedy of the commons. Our theoretical model of
emergent sustainability helps us to understand the diversity and dynamics of property regimes across a wide
range of social–ecological systems and explains the enigma of open access without a tragedy. We recom-
mend that policy interventions in such self-organizing systems should focus on managing the conditions that
are critical for the emergence and persistence of sustainability.
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Current theoretical models of the commons assert that
common-pool resources can only be managed sus-
tainably with clearly defined boundaries around both
communities and the resources that they use (1). In
these models, open access, or the failure to exclude
users, inevitably leads to a tragedy of the commons
due to unchecked resource use. However, in many
social–ecological systems, open access does not lead
to resource overuse (2–5). For example, in the Logone
Floodplain of Cameroon, pastoralists have open ac-
cess to common-pool grazing resources, but there is
no evidence of overgrazing or rangeland degradation.
Here, individual movement decisions lead to an ideal
free distribution of grazing pressure over available
grazing resources (6). Multiple lines of evidence from
ethnographic analysis, spatial analyses, and agent-
based modeling show that this open property regime
works as a self-organizing system without central or
collective management of resource use and is effi-
cient, equitable, and sustainable (7). Similar properties
characterize other open-access systems, including
among pastoralists in Turkmenistan (2) and foragers
in the desert of Western Australia (8), in which current
resource use is sustainable, because it does not
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compromise use of common-pool resources for future
generations.
Here, we outline a theoretical model that describes the
conditions under which sustainability emerges in open property
regimes. We argue that sustainability can emerge in the absence
of central or collective management as a product of the resource-
use strategies of individual users—or more formally, that sustain-
ability is an emergent property of a self-organizing complex adap-
tive system (7). Here, we define complex adaptive systems as
systems “in which large networks of components with no central
control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collec-
tive behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adapta-
tion via learning or evolution” (9).
Our theoretical model integrates multiple frameworks. Theo-
ries of the commons provide the terminology that we use to
describe the users, governance system, resource units, and resource
system as well as the overarching question of what makes social–
ecological systems sustainable (1, 10). Evolutionary frameworks of
behavioral ecology and niche construction enable us to generate
hypotheses of individual decision making and the dynamic feed-
backs between individual resource use and ecological processes,
respectively (11, 12). A resilience framework explains how different
configurations of resource use can result in different outcomes or
property regimes (13, 14), and complexity theory helps us explain
how dynamic feedback between processes in human and natural
systems results in nonlinear dynamics that can make open property
regimes sustainable (9, 15).
We used a transdisciplinary approach, which not only inte-
grates and synthesizes methods and theories from different
disciplines but also integrates concepts from the cultural commu-
nities that we have studied, to compare eight empirical cases
from a range of social–ecological systems, identify eight critical
conditions (CCs) for the emergence of sustainability in open
property regimes, and explain how changes in boundary condi-
tions (BCs) may push open property regimes either to a tragedy of
the commons or to other types of property regimes. Our empir-
ical cases draw from a wide range of subsistence economies and
ecosystems, including pastoralists in the Logone Floodplain of
Cameroon (5), pastoralists in the Darkhad Depression in northern
Mongolia (16), pastoralists in the Gökdepe District in Turkmeni-
stan (2), freshwater fishers in the Pantanal wetlands of Brazil (17),
shellfish gatherers in the mangrove swamps of Ecuador (3), sub-
sistence foragers in the desert of Western Australia (8), swidden
agriculturalists in Belize (18), and commercial lobster fishers in
Maine (19) (Fig. 1). The case studies were selected, because they
represented a wide variety of social–ecological systems that have
been studied by the authors and/or other researchers for a de-
cade (e.g., swidden agriculturalists in Belize, shellfish gatherers in
Ecuador) or more (e.g., commercial lobster fishers in Maine, mo-
bile pastoralists in Cameroon) and/or for which long-term social
and ecological data were available that allowed us to develop and
support our argument about the emergence of sustainability in
open property regimes.
Theoretical Model
Our integrative theoretical model offers several hypotheses pre-
dicting the conditions under which resource use is sustainable
with open access to common-pool resources. Central or collective
management is unlikely and open-access tenure regimes are
more likely where there are few economic gains from defending
exclusive use. Theory in behavioral ecology suggests that the
benefits of defending exclusive access to resource patches are
greater where there are high levels of exploitation competition
and where resources are found in dense, discrete, and predictable
patches in both time and space (20). However, when the spatio-
temporal distribution of resources is highly variable, sustainable
Fig. 1. Location of cases.
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use of resource is more likely where users are free to distribute
themselves in proportion to resource availability. Ideal free dis-
tribution models predict that, under conditions of nearly costless
movement or where the costs of movement are small compared
with the gains within resource patches, individuals will distribute
themselves in proportion to available resources such that, at the
landscape scale, the gain rate of all individuals is equalized (21).
Individuals are more likely to be able to do this where the renewal
rate of resources is high and knowledge about resource hetero-
geneity is easily acquired or shared between individuals. Niche
construction theory predicts that sustainability may also be en-
hanced by intentional or unintentional processes of ecological
manipulation (12), while complexity theory predicts that nonlinear
feedbacks between individual behavior and ecological processes
will fine-tune resource-use strategies toward more sustainable
outcomes over the long term when users adapt to environmental
cues (22). Finally, theories of the commons predict that shared
norms over the importance of equal access to resources and
norms that set limits to status through accumulation are critical to
preventing individuals from attempting to claim individual own-
ership over resources (1).
Our theoretical framework thus identifies the following eight
conditions as critical for the emergence of sustainable use of
common-pool resources in open property regimes: (i) the re-
source system is highly productive relative to the number of users,
leading to low levels of exploitation competition; (ii) the distri-
bution of resources is patchy in space and time, and there is a
degree of unpredictability or stochasticity in patch return rates; (iii)
the costs of individual mobility are low relative to the gains within
patches, and individuals can track changes in resource density
between patches; (iv) users share sets of norms, which frame
common-pool resources as a public good with free access for all;
(v) users gain knowledge of the resource system through pro-
cesses of individual and social learning, which allow them to fine-
tune their resource-use strategies to particular ecological systems;
(vi) resource-use strategies may shift natural systems toward
higher productivity; (vii) the nonequilibrium dynamics of the
ecological system may buffer or enhance the rate of resource
renewal; and (viii ) there are limits on resource accumulation due to
social, economic, and/or technological constraints. Below, we will
first explain these eight CCs and illustrate them with examples
from the eight cases, and then, we will discuss five BCs that are
necessary for the emergence of sustainability in these systems
(Fig. 2 shows the interactions between CCs and BCs; a more
detailed description of all eight CCs for each of the cases is in
Dataset S1).
CC1: Low Potential for Exploitation Competition. A low level of
exploitation competition between users for resources is the first
CC for the emergence of sustainable resource use in open
property regime systems. The degree of exploitation competition
is a function of multiple factors, including the productivity of the
resource, the number of resource users, and the cost of resource
defense. Increases in average density of resources within patches
tend to make resources more economically defensible and sub-
ject to individual or group ownership. However, when patch
productivity is high relative to the number of resource users, either
because the number of users is very small or because the patch is
extremely productive, there are few benefits for defending ex-
clusive access (20). Similarly, when resources are low value,
abundant, and not clumped, like grazing resources, there are few
net benefits for defending exclusive access. In all but one of our
cases, the resource system is productive enough and population
densities are low enough to minimize the potential for exploita-
tion competition. Common-pool grazing resources in Cameroon,
for example, are low value, low density, and widely distributed,
and therefore, the potential for exploitation competition is low,
because the benefits do not outweigh the costs of defending
the resources.
CC2: Spatiotemporal Variability in Resource Distribution. The
second CC is spatiotemporal variability in resource distribution.
Users contending with predictably varying or uniform resource
distributions tend to have higher rates of return when resource
access is controlled, monitored, and defended by a group of users
(20). When the opposite holds and spatiotemporal variability of
the resource is high, there are fewer advantages to controlling
exclusive access by a smaller group of users, and tenure systems
tend toward open property regimes (23). Variability in resource
production and distribution can be driven by a wide array of cli-
matic and other natural processes and disturbances, including
interannual variation in temperature, precipitation, fire, and flood-
ing, as well as through more complex interactions between human
and natural systems. Such is the case in Western Australia, where
anthropogenic fire regimes and unpredictable rainfall interact to
change the distribution of subsistence resources, leading to sub-
stantial spatial and temporal variability in the location of the most
productive regions.
CC3: Mobile Users Track Resource Patchiness. The third con-
dition is that users maintain high degrees of mobility to track
spatiotemporal variability in resource productivity. When the costs
of mobility are low, users optimize their own rates of return by
distributing themselves in proportion to resource availability. In
moving to maximize their own returns, regions with low pro-
ductivity are often abandoned, while regions of high productivity
support a higher density of resource users. When the costs of
mobility are low, resource overuse is less likely, because gains are
higher from moving than from additional exploitation of the cur-
rent patch. The scale of mobility differs, but in each case, it is
linked to the scale of resource distribution: in low-density eco-
systems, like Australia and Mongolia, residential movements oc-
cur at the scale of hundreds of kilometers, while in tropical
habitats, like Belize, movements in search of more productive
habitat occur on the scale of tens of kilometers. Mobility may be
driven by search strategies that result from information sharing
under conditions of uncertainty as in the case of the Pantanal
Floodplain in Brazil (17).
CC4: Ethos and Practice of Open Access to Resources.Mobility
as a strategy to maximize returns is only possible when accom-
panied by an ethos and practice of open access that allows mobile
users to track spatiotemporal variability in resource productivity.
In all but one of our cases, rules exist to facilitate, rather than
hinder, open access to common-pool resources or land, and users
share a worldview in which these are considered public goods. In
Western Australia, land tenure is a complex set of rights and ob-
ligations gained via a flexible set of alternate pathways. Sacred
knowledge and sites on the landscape are individually owned, but
the rights to hunt, gather, and drink water are generally open to all
or subject to an “always ask” policy for which the answer is always
yes (24). People traveling through country to which they do not
belong (or one that is unfamiliar to them) are able to hunt and
gather to sustain themselves but must refrain from burning the
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grass so as not to unintentionally threaten any sacred sites until
information about their location has been obtained from local site
owners. After consultation, anyone can burn or hunt anywhere
that they choose. As such, the tenure system regulating use of
natural resources functions more like open property than common
property: unlike common property systems, there are no bound-
aries delineating one community’s foraging region from another
or bounded social group collaborating to exclude others from
that region.
CC5: Resource-Use Strategies Are Adapted to Resource
Dynamics. In all of our cases, feedbacks between social and
ecological systems create a dynamic coevolutionary interaction in
which social processes shape the ecological system and ecological
processes shape the social system (12). In practice, users gain
knowledge of the dynamics of the resource system through pro-
cesses of individual and social learning, which allow them to fine-
tune their resource-use strategies to the particulars of the ecolog-
ical system. While individual experience is certainly a major factor in
this learning process, in each of our cases, users also gain in-
formation about resource dynamics and the state of the resource
system from the success or failure of other users through a process
that involves both direct observation and networks of socialization
and communication in which people share experiences, knowl-
edge, and information in much the same spirit of generosity as they
would share material resources. Importantly, this process of in-
formation gathering and sharing leads to future changes in be-
havior. In the Pantanal Floodplain in Brazil, to optimize the search
for the best fishing spots, people openly share the location of good
fishing spots during iced tea drinking sessions but also validate this
information through direct observation of fishing catches (17). In
Belize, swidden farmers carefully study weather patterns and dis-
cuss the timing of clearing, burning, planting, and harvesting events
in the agricultural cycle. Information about key environmental dy-
namics is also gained while participating in labor groups to help
other farmers with agricultural activities or by observing, for ex-
ample, that other farmers are burning by the quantity of smoke in
the air on a given day. Farmers use this information to plan where
they will clear their next fields (18).
CC6: Resource Use Increases System Productivity and Sus-
tainability. In many of our cases, sustainability is a function not
just of the intrinsic productivity of the resource system or the strat-
egies of its users but also, of the positive inputs of the resource users
themselves, which make the system more productive. In grassland
ecosystems, pastoralism often leads to localized shifts in productivity
Fig. 2. Theoretical model with interactions between CCs and BCs.
12862 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1812028115 Moritz et al.
and plant diversity as animals disturb soil, prefer certain vegetation
over others, and locally increase soil nutrients through manure de-
posits (25). In Mongolia, grass productivity around established pas-
toral camps is higher than in areas around more recent camps,
indicating that pastoral use, including manuring by flocks, may in-
crease grass productivity. An alternative possibility is that estab-
lished camps have better grazing, because they selected the best
sites. Nevertheless, in both explanations, long-term grazing does
not threaten the resource system. Similarly, research suggests co-
evolution of grazing and floodplain vegetation across African
floodplains (26). In Australia, the subsistence practices of Martu
foragers center on the burning of grassland habitats to hunt bur-
rowed animals, mainly large monitor lizards. Burning increases im-
mediate hunting returns more than 10-fold but also, positively
impacts future foraging returns by creating a diverse landscape of
vegetation at different stages of recovery after the fire. These
hunting fires create landscapes that provide people with higher
returns over the long term due to increases in both patch pro-
ductivity and reductions in patch dispersion (4).
CC7: Ecological Dynamics Keep the System in a Nonequilib-
rium State. The seventh CC is nonequilibrium dynamics, in which
repeated disturbances limit harvesting capability (27). Non-
equilibrium systems are driven primarily by stochastic abiotic
factors, like fire, rainfall, or snowstorms, which lead to highly var-
iable and unpredictable primary production (28). These dynamics
protect system productivity by making it difficult for users to
overexploit resources (29). In northern Mongolia, pastoralists in
the Darkhad Depression experience extensive spatiotemporal
variability in pasture productivity. While herd mortality in the
winter is an annual constraint on livestock populations, unpre-
dictable bad winter storms, known as dzuds, happen on average
once every 10 years and can kill up to 80% of the herd, further
reducing herds below carrying capacity (30). In our Australia case
study, the sustainability of the system is maintained in part by a
long recovery period before the grass becomes dense enough
to carry a fire and thus, provide foragers with high hunting returns.
In the swidden in Belize, biomass and soil fertility recover slowly,
and this limits agricultural productivity.
CC8: Limits on Resource Accumulation. The eighth condition,
which found in nearly all of our cases, is the presence of mecha-
nisms constraining resource accumulation by individual users.
These mechanisms can be social, economic, and/or technological
and can help to minimize the risk of overexploitation of common-
pool resources, although they are not necessarily “designed” to
constrain resource accumulation. In our pastoral cases, the accu-
mulation of livestock is constrained by natural growth of family
herds, as there is little external capital investment in the pastoral
production system to support faster herd growth. Similarly, tidal
cycles dictate accessibility to the mangroves for fishers in Ecuador,
and cockles and crabs are harvested by hand only during low tide.
During neap tides, harvesters stay close to shore, but during
spring tides, harvesters are able to travel farther out. Few fishers
have access to motorized transportation, limiting the spatial mo-
bility of harvesters, because they are unwilling or unable to pay
the transport costs to more distant sites. In Belize’s swidden farms,
social norms related to subsistence agriculture and labor reci-
procity can limit resource accumulation (18). In Australia, the
open-access policies in Martu foraging communities are un-
derwritten by an ethos of equitability that ensures that any pro-
ductive surplus or knowledge about the location of that surplus is
shared widely among all present. Martu foragers who are more
productive are also more generous with their surplus, and in so
doing, they foster more cooperative relationships with others (31).
BCs and Shifts in Property Regimes
External demographic, economic, and political drivers influence
whether the CCs associated with sustainability of open property
regimes persist. We have identified five BCs that describe the
states of external drivers that are necessary for the emergence of
sustainability in these systems, including (i) low population den-
sities and thus, low levels of resource competition; (ii) low cir-
cumscription and thus, limited restrictions on mobility; (iii) low
market value of common-pool resources harvested; (iv) low capital
investments (and appropriate technology); and (v) low encapsu-
lation by the state and thus, little interference in everyday use of
common-pool resources at the local level (a more detailed de-
scription of these BCs in each of the case studies is in Dataset S1).
Changes in these BCsmay push the system to a common property
regime with social and spatial boundaries or toward a tragedy of
the commons. Our case studies also illustrate how property re-
gimes may change over time due to different processes (e.g.,
government interventions, incorporation in the market, pop-
ulation growth) that change the BCs (e.g., increase in market value
of resources, increase in population density) and may facilitate a
shift from an open property regime to other property regimes (or
hybrids thereof) (Fig. 3 shows the position of the cases on a
continuum of property regimes). The lobster fishery in Maine is a
good example of a shift from open access to a common property
regime, but we have also observed shifts from open to private
property regimes. In the Adamawa Region of Cameroon, for ex-
ample, there is a shift from pastoralism to ranching, which entails
the enclosure of privately owned rangelands that used to be un-
der an open property regime, and in rural Ecuador, individual
households have created holding pens for cockle shells that are
held until they reach legal size for the market.
BC1: Low Population Densities. Low levels of resource compe-
tition are often a product of low population densities (32). When
user populations increase, there are often negative consequences
for resource sustainability. For example, in Turkmenistan, the rural
pastoralist population density is low but is increasing because of
low urban migration and continued population growth. The grass
on which their cattle graze is a scare resource, and it is unclear how
much more additional livestock the system can sustain. In the
Chad Basin, the insecurity caused by Boko Haram has led to the
forced migration of thousands of pastoralists and hundreds of
thousands of cattle from Nigeria to Cameroon, doubling the
grazing pressure in the region and increasing the resource use.
There are low levels of exploitation in open property regimes, but
under common property regimes with clearly defined boundaries
for the user group and resource system, there are controlled levels
of resource exploitation, as resource users regulate access. Thus,
open property regimes may change into common property re-
gimes under conditions of increasing population densities and
more intense resource exploitation.
BC2: Low Degree of Circumscription. Circumscription refers to
the degree to which a user group is constrained politically or
physically from moving beyond its resource system (sensu ref. 33).
Social–ecological systems are embedded in larger regional and
political systems, and the extent to which these impact and/or
encroach on the mobility and ability to track resources can prevent
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the emergence of sustainability. For example, in the Pantanal fish-
eries in Brazil, the creation of seven strictly protected areas has led
to economic and physical displacement of fishers, which jeopar-
dizes their customary rotational fishing system (34). In small coastal
fisheries in Ecuador, the development of shrimp aquaculture has
degraded the quality of the estuarine habitat and displaced many
artisanal fishers from their customary grounds (35). To address the
major threats to mangroves by unregulated aquaculture and ur-
banization, the government began allocating collective stewardship
rights to formally organized fishing associations in 2000 for man-
grove conservation and fisheries management. Shellfish collectors
are concerned that they are losing access to their customary gath-
ering grounds to new kinds of enclosure by collective stewardship
rights, which are only allocated to fishing associations (36).
BC3: Low Market Value of Common-Pool Resources. Access to
markets and commodity production tends to foster more un-
sustainable exploitation (37). The market value of the common-
pool resources in our cases is generally low, leading to relatively
little competition or interest from other users. For example, the
grasses that serve as forage for cattle of pastoralists in Cameroon
have practically no market value, and thus, there are no
entrepreneurs cutting grass at the end of the rainy season to dry it
and sell it later in the dry season as hay. In Ecuadorian mangrove
fisheries, cockles, crabs, and finfish harvested in mangroves are
commercially valuable, but market demand is small compared
with export-oriented industrial pelagic fisheries and farm-raised
shrimp. However, in Maine, lobster is the most economically
valuable fishery and the backbone of the state’s marine economy,
making up three-quarters of the total value of all commercial
fisheries landings. The high market value of lobsters is one of the
reasons why the lobster fisheries in Maine shifted from an open to
a common property regime (38). For swidden farmers in southern
Belize, accessing markets during most of the 20th century was
physically difficult, and certain forest-based products were in
demand for only a few years or cyclically as development efforts
ebbed (39). Growing maize is only commercially viable at low
levels because of the intensive labor requirements; however,
other products, such as rice, cacao, and cattle, now compete with
swidden for land. This increasing demand is reducing the sus-
tainability of the entire social–ecological system and moving it
toward a future state as either a common property regime or a
tragedy of the commons.
Fig. 3. Cases on continuum of property regimes.
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BC4: Low External Capital Investments. In addition to limits on
internal capital resource accumulation (CC8), emergent sustain-
ability in open property regimes requires there to be little capital
investment from external sources. External capital investment can
change resource extraction strategies through investment in tech-
nology and lead to overexploitation. For example, technological
improvements or mechanization can quickly overcome the eco-
logical dynamics that limit overexploitation of natural resources. In
the Adamawa Region of Cameroon, there is a shift from pastoralism
with open access to common-pool grazing resources to ranching
with private and exclusive ownership of grazing lands. This shift has
major implications for the sustainability of the social–ecological
system, as mobility is reduced and stocking rates are increased due
to the use of commercially produced supplementary feed that al-
lows cattle to survive and overcome the dry season bottleneck.
Similarly, increased investment in artisanal and small-scale fisheries
can shift fishery techniques away from high labor cost and low
returns (e.g., hand set gill nets, cast nets, line and hook) to mech-
anization of marine fisheries, which is a major driver in the decline of
global oceanic fish stocks.
BC5: Encapsulation by the State. Encapsulation by the state
refers to the degree to which users have the political autonomy to
govern common-pool resources (40) or to what extent the state in-
terferes with the everyday use and/or governance of common-pool
resources at the local level. AsOstrom (1, 10) and others have shown
for common property regimes, state interventions often have neg-
ative consequences for sustainable management of common-pool
resources. This is also true for open property regimes, where state
interventions can threaten resource-use strategies that are critical for
the emergence of sustainability. In the case of Ecuador’s cockle
fishery, formalizing informal open property regimes into collective
stewardship rights or “custodias” offers substantial tradeoffs (35).
The implementation of collective stewardship rights has resulted in
larger catch and cockle shell sizes, empowerment of artisanal fishers
after decades of struggle against encroaching shrimp farmers, and a
new sense of cultural pride among artisanal fishers. However, the
allocation of stewardship rights to certain fishing associations has
reorganized the spatial distribution of customary norms, and in ex-
treme cases, it has resulted in displacement of fishers from their
ancestral gathering grounds if they are not formally organized into
fishing associations. In contrast to increasing encapsulation in the
Ecuadorian case, in the Mongolian and Turkmenistan cases, there
was decreasing encapsulation, which resulted in greater freedom of
movement and ability to track spatiotemporal variability in resource
productivity. In the 1990s, the Mongolian state withdrew pre-
cipitously from rural areas, dismantling the collective institutions that
had regulated and supported pastoralism. The result was un-
regulated open access in what Mongolians call “the age of the
market.” Turkmenistan, however, maintained the collective farms,
but it changed their names and limited their involvement in day-to-
day pastoral decision making. The resulting arrangements have
been characterized as regulated open access (2).
Implications
In each case study, sustainable use of common-pool resources
emerges from the bottom up without centralized or collective
decision making. Our theoretical framework proposes that this
emergent sustainability is maintained by complex positive and
negative feedbacks between people and their environments, in-
cluding in many cases, ecological feedbacks in which use of
a resource contributes positively to its own persistence or
distribution. As such, our perspective broadens the nature of
human–environment interactions to encompass a wide range
of ecological functions that go well beyond simply being a force of
destructive disturbance (41). When socioecological systems are
place based (i.e., entangled locally in a network of positive and
negative interactions), there is the opportunity for coevolutionary
forces to shape adaptive responses on the part of both the social
system and the ecological system.
Our theoretical model has several theoretical and methodo-
logical implications. One is the understanding that we gain in
approaching the study of the dynamics of highly integrated so-
cial–ecological systems. Studying such integrated systems is fa-
cilitated by making analytical distinctions between processes
within and coupling between human and natural systems (42). This
coupled systems approach necessarily requires an equally in-
tegrated research approach, requiring that research methods in-
tegrate both social science and natural science. This goes beyond
just different researchers working separately on separately for-
mulated research questions and hypotheses but must include a
research design capable of resolving the interaction between the
social and the ecological. This exceeds the call for collaborative
projects between social and natural scientists, the standard in
coupled human–natural systems work, requiring research that is
able to span multiple spatial and temporal scales, especially from
individuals to groups and from patches to landscapes, as well as
the interactions between those scales (14).
Because these systems are likely to exhibit nonlinear historical
trajectories or out-of-equilibrium states, traditional datasets may be
too small, and standard statistical approaches may not be adequate
to identify or predict transitions between property regimes, thus
requiring alternative methods, such as long-term high-intensity
data collection (43), advanced computational agent-based model-
ing (44, 45), and long-term ethnographic analysis (22).
Finally and most importantly, it requires that we study users as
part of the ecosystem, because it is their use of the resources that is
key to sustainability and productivity of the system—it is an in-
tegrated system. This has implications for how we conceptualize
these interactions. If interactions between humans and other spe-
cies are framed as “management,” it suggests that humans do
something very different from other organisms. Management im-
plies conscious intent to shape ecological interactions to support a
unique human value and sets humans apart as stewards of nature
rather than agents whose actions belong there. By calling every-
thing management, we risk misunderstanding the nature of the
complex interactions that shape sustainability in societies that do
not have such top-down structures and restrictive tenure regimes.
We recommend that policy interventions in such systems should
not focus onmanaging the resource itself but onmanaging the CCs
and BCs that lead to the emergence of sustainability in self-
organizing systems (46). For example, in pastoral systems, mobility
is a key adaptation to track the spatiotemporal variability in re-
source distributions, and sustainability of pastoral ecosystems can
be supported by protecting not only pastoralist access to the re-
source but also, their freedom to move (47). A similar approach
would benefit fisheries and swidden farming systems. Our model
helps move toward this by identifying the conditions that are critical
for the emergence of sustainability in open property regimes.
Another policy recommendation is to view users as an integral
part of the social–ecological system. This is not a new idea, but it is
worth repeating, because the default intervention is top-down
management that separates people from their country, concep-
tually and practically (32). An example of such an approach that
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considers both social and ecological dynamics has been informing
policy interventions in both Canada and Australia as part of
Healthy Country, Healthy People initiatives (48). Such initiatives
recognize the critical interaction between the health of ecosys-
tems and the social and cultural wellbeing of both individuals and
the societies of which they are a part—not just recognizing that
healthy ecosystems make for healthier people but that healthy
social structures and healthy people create more sustainable
ecological systems.
While it may seem that our cases are relatively small and in-
creasingly rare subsistence-oriented social–ecological systems
in the age of increasingly telecoupled systems (49), these are
modern systems that not only provide livelihoods for the people
living within them but also, contribute to the global market
economy (50). However, telecouplings, like the incorporation in
the global market economy, may lead to changes in the CCs
and BCs and may threaten the sustainability of these social–
ecological systems. In particular, population growth may lead to
increasing circumscription and/or competition for common-pool
resources, while incorporation in the global market economy
may lead to greater capital investments and overexploitation of
these resources.
Conclusion
The framework of complex adaptive system explains how sustain-
ability emerges and persists in social–ecological systems with open
access to common-pool resources. It solves the enigma of open
access without a tragedy. The key to sustainable use of common-
pool resources in these social–ecological systems is self-organization
(i.e., the idea that sustainability emerges from individual resource
use within dynamic social–ecological systems that are in non-
equilibrium). We think that the principles of self-organization not
only explain the dynamics of our cases but also, can serve as a guide
for how to understand and support the emergence of sustainability
in other situations of open access to common-pool resources.
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